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This denies a plaintiff the opportunity to ignore the subpoena and contest
the relevancy of the investigation in a contempt proceeding. Perhaps the
most far reaching impact of the present decision is its apparent approval of
potentially abusive investigatory power in an agency that is not required to
defend its actions in court.
BERT SIMON

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE SANCTITY OF A PRIVATE CLUB
PREVAILS IN A STATE ACTION INQUIRY
Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 530 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1976)
Plaintiffs, black and Jewish applicants for membership in defendant
Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, brought suit alleging that the club had engaged
in discriminatory membership practices' in violation of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 2 Plaintiffs contended that the city of Miami's leasing' of bay
bottom land to this private club for a nominal fee constituted sufficient state
action 4 to bring the club within the purview of the fourteenth amendment.5
1. This is to be distinguished from formal membership policies. The club by-laws have
never prohibited membership to the Jewish faith or black race. Admission is by sponsorship
of three members, "due investigation," and a favorable vote by the Board of Governors. No
Jewish or black persons have been members in the club's 88-year history with the exception
of one honorary black member, the Commodore of the Jamaica Yacht Club.
2. Plaintiffs sought and were granted declaratory and injunctive relief under 42
U.S.C. §§1981, 1983, and 2000(a) (1970). Since the Fifth granted relief under §1983,
the §1981 and §2000(a) claims were not considered. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970) provides:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." Two elements
must be proved in order to recover under §1983: there must be a deprivation of a constitutional right by the defendant, and this act must be done under color of state law. Adickes
v. S.H. Kress 9- Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Smith v. YMCA, 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972).
3. Plaintiffs also originally brought suit against the city of Miami seeking by judicial
decree to compel the city to enforce certain city ordinances prohibiting discrimination by
lessees of city-owned property or, in the alternative, to enjoin the city from leasing
adjacent bay bottom land to the Biscayne Bay Yacht Club. The trial court dismissed
the city as a party to the §1983 action after the city adopted a resolution deferring any
extension of the lease with the club pending the outcome of the litigation. As held in
City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973), a city is not a person for purposes of
equitable relief. Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 370 F. Supp. 1038, 1044 (S.D. Fla.
1973).
4. See notes 15 and 16 infra and accompanying text for a definition of state action.
See generally Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLuM. L. REv. 1083 (1960).
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, §1 provides in part: "No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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The trial court found that the club discriminated in its membership practices
and that such discrimination was under color of state law; 6 therefore, both
7
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the fourteenth amendment were violated.
A panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the club came within
the prescription of the fourteenth amendment since the city "fostered the
club's continued existence and prosperity by providing" a lease of public
lands for a nominal fee.8 On rehearing en banc the Fifth Circuit reversed and
HELD, the leasing of bay bottom land by a city to a private club for a
nominal fee 9 is an insufficient basis on which to find state action.1o
The private club remains one of the last vestiges of institutionalized discrimination" largely because of the specific exemption granted in the 1964
Civil Rights Act.' 2 Several legal theories, however, have been advanced
to challenge private club discrimination. 3 The most prominent of these is
the state action doctrine.14 This doctrine is grounded on the established
principle that the fourteenth amendment limits only governmental action
6. "'State action' and 'under color of' law are generally perceived as alternative ways
of expressing the same legal principle" Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d
873, 877 n.7 (5th Cir. 1975); Parish v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 506 F.2d 1028, 1031
(5th Cir. 1975). Justice Brennan, however, views "under color of" law as more restrictive
than the concept of state action. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 184 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
7. 370 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
8. 521 F.2d 344, 353 (5th Cir. 1975).
9. For additional facts see text accompanying notes 58 & 61 infra.
10. Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 530 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1976).
11. Institutionalized discrimination as used here includes racial, religious, sexual, and
ethnic biases practiced by private dubs.
14. 42 U.S.C. §2000(e) (1964) provides: "The provisions of this subchapter shall not
apply to a private dub or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to
the extent that the facilities of such establishment are made available to the customers
or patrons of an establishment within the scope of subsection (b) of this section."
Although private dubs are exempt, the exemption is not a license to discriminate but
rather a directive that the remedy for discrimination is not available under that law. The
exemption, however, does show legislative deference to traditional concepts of rights of
association and privacy. See Clover Hill Swimming Club, Inc. v. Goldsboro, 47 N.J. 25, 34,
219 A.2d 161, 166 (1966). See also Note, Public Accommodation Laws and the Private
Club, 54 GEO. L.J. 915, 918 (1966).
3. In addition to the state action doctrine, two other legal theories exist that are
beybnd the scope of this comment. First, the definitional approach is used principally to
counter the large number of restaurants, swimming pools, and golf dubs that quickly
closed on passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and subsequently reopened as private dubs.
See Note, supra note 12, at 915; Note, Constitutional Law-Private Club Discrimination,

1970 Wis. L. REv. 595. The second theory, the badge of slavery approach, has breathed new
life into the old civil rights laws but is extremely limited in application. See generally
Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Came Around at Last, 55 VA. L. Rv. 272
(1969); Larson, The New Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 470.
14. The historical beginning of state action analysis was shaped in the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883), in which the Supreme Court enunciated the distinction
between state and individual action. In those cases the Court restricted the scope of the
federal acts to cover only discrimination fostered by some action on the part of the state.
See generally Frank & Munroe, The Original Understanding of Equal Protection of the
Laws, 1972 WAsH. U.L.Q. 421, 476-78; Hyman, Segregation and the Fourteenth Amendment,
4 VAM. L. Rav. 555, 569-72 (1951).
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and "erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory
or wrongful."' 5 While conceptually clear, the state action doctrine has been
enigmatic in application: the dichotomy between state and private action
has eluded precise distinctions.' 6 Although the doctrine originated and has
developed primarily in cases involving racial discrimination," 7 ithas been
applied more recently to other areas of ostensibly private activity18

Several theories of state action"9 are available for those, as yet, rare
challenges to a bona fide private club's 20 discriminatory membership practices.
The first is the public function theory, 2' which restricts the private exercise
of essentially governmental power. 22 For example, in Smith v. Young Men's
Christian Association,'2 the YMCA, a private organization, was held to be a
15. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). Accord, Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 721 (1961). "Individual invasion of individual rights is not the
subject matter of the amendment." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). See also
note 14 supra.
Membership in a private club has never been recognized as a constitutional right.
See, e.g., Sims v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 343 F. Supp. 112 (D.C.
Mass. 1972); STP Corp. v. United States Auto Club, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 146 (D.C. Ind. 1968).
16. See note 34 infra. "This Court has never attempted the 'impossible task' of formulating an infallible test for determining whether the State . . . has become significantly
involved in private discriminations [so as to constitute state action]." Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967). State action analysis of governmental involvement requires the
application of a two-pronged test: (1) whether the involvement is constitutionally meaningful, and (2) whether there is significant involvement to invoke the fourteenth amendment.
The state action doctrine may be guided by principles but will never become entirely
susceptible to precise and mechanical application; moreover, this inquiry often requires a
balancing of the competing interests. See generally Horowitz, The Misleading Search for
State Action Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208, 218 (1957); Note,
State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REy. 840 (1974).
17. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
See generally Bassett, The Reemergence of the State Action Requirement in Race Relations
Cases, 22 CATH. U.L. REV. 39 (1972); Black, The Supreme Court 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L.
REV. 69 (1967); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEX.-Is L. REV. 347 (1963).
18. This expansion has occurred primarily in cases dealing with first amendment
rights. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
19. See Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private
Activity, 74 CoLuM. L. REv. 656, 658 (1974). Although these theories are distinct within
the doctrine of state action, they are generally not mutually exclusive in application.
For example, while the public function theory, see text accompanying notes 21-26
infra, was emphasized in Smith v. YMCA, 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972), the court also
applied the joint actor approach, see text accompanying notes 27-31 infra, to further support
its decision.
20. Bona fide is used to denote clubs serving only the needs of their members as
distinguished from sham clubs, which, although denominating themselves as clubs, hold
out their services to the general public for pecuniary gain.
21. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (privately incorporated town held
state actor).
22. Id. The service involved must be not only one that is the exclusive prerogative of
the state but also one that the state is under an affirmative duty to provide. Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). See also Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.
1968).
23. 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972). The YMCA was not recognized as a bona fide private
club because membership is open to the general public and a small group controls the
organization's policies.
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state actor because of its agreement with the city to provide recreational
programs. 24 This assumption of a city program by a private organization conferred on the YMCA a municipal character that made its discriminatory
conduct offensive to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 5 The focus of this theory is the nature of the challenged private
28
activity rather than the actual role of the state.
A second method of discerning state action is the joint actor or agency
concept.27 Here, the inquiry is whether the state and the private entity are
so interdependent as to result in a symbiotic relationship. 28 The Supreme
Court introduced the theory in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,29
in which Justice Clark found that the state was so far enmeshed in a position
of interdependence with a privately operated restaurant that it had to be
recognized as a joint participant in the restaurant's discrimination. State
action in Burton was predicated on a lessor-lessee relationship, and the Court
heavily emphasized the public nature of the restaurant and parking garage
facilities.30 Thus, the joint actor theory precludes the government from utilizing
private organizations to circumvent constitutional prohibitions. 31 The
proximity of the private entity to the state .and the prominence of their
interdependence are two determinative factors of this concept.
Finally, pervasive governmental regulation -or financial assistance may
have the effect of fostering or supporting a private entity engaged in - a
constitutionally forbidden activity. Accordingly, if the state becomes
significantly entwined in the managerial control of a private organization-2 or
allocates substantial governmental assistance to this association,33 the organiza24. The Fifth Circuit further supported its finding of state action by stating that:

"The YMCA enjoyed tax exempt status, it utilized city property ... and it derived income
from the city." 462 F.2d 634,-647 (5th Cir. 1972).
25. Furthermore, there was evidence that the YMCA and the city had colluded
through the agreement to bar blacks from recreational programs. Id. at 638 nn. 4 & 5.
26. See, t.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
27. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See Lewis, Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority -A Case Without Precedent, 61 COLUm. L. REv. 1458
(1961).
28.

Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972). The term connotes the

intensity of the interrelationship between the state and private entity for state action
purposes under the joint actor theory.
29. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
30. Id. at 723. In Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 924 (1957), the Fifth Circuit set the precedent for state action on the basis of a

lessor-lessee relationship, distinguishing between leased property still required for state
'purposes and that which is leased but is surplus. Although the majority in Burton
"acknowledged this distinction, the Court found it unnecessary to rule on this point.
The
legal status of this distinction is presently unknown.
31. See, e.g., Evaiis v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970). The government need not regulate,
command, oi influence under the joint actor theory since'state inaction is sufficient.
32. Evans v. Neivton, 382 U.S. 296, 300 (1966)..33: See New York City Jaycees; Inc. v. United States Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir.
1975). Although the private organization received one third ($1,143,000) of its' annual
budgit'.from federal funds, the court did not find a sufficiently close nexus between the
state and the challenged, action- of sexual discrimination in membership policies to treat
the action of the private organization as -those of the state.
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tion becomes tainted with state action. Under this theory, factual determinations concerning the nature and degree of involvement necessary for state
34
action are decisive.
Governmental regulation through state liquor licensing was found to be
insufficient state involvement to render unconstitutional a private club's res5
fusal to serve a member's black guest in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, failed to find the symbiotic
relationship disclosed in Burton. The two cases were distinguished on the
basis that in Burton the restaurant was open to the public and located in
a building on public property, whereas in Moose Lodge the club was ostensibly
private and located on private property. 36
Decisions dealing with governmental aid to private organizations have
not been consistent3 In .Pitts v. Department of Revenue,3s Wisconsin state
statutes 39 that granted tax exemptions to various private organizations, including discriminatory fraternal associations, were successfully challenged as
state action that violates the fourteenth amendment. Relying on the overriding
constitutional interest in prohibiting racial discrimination, the Pitts court
adopted a "lesser standard" of state involvement. 40 More recently, the Fifth
Circuit utilized a similar analysis in Greco v. Orange Memorial Hospital.41 In
that decision, the court specifically noted that while the amount of state
34. Since state action permeates most private activity to some degree, the issue becomes
what state action is significant enough to justify the imposition of the constitutional obligation of equal protection under the law on so-called private activity. Pennsylvania v. Brown,
270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aft'd, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
921 (1968).
35. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). See Comment, The Rights of Private Clubs to Discriminate
Against Black Guests Despite a State-Issued Liquor License, 26 U. MIAMI L. REv. 833 (1972).
36. 407 U.S. at 175. Whether Moose Lodge reflected concern for the position of the
private club, or merely showed judicial restraint in the wholesale expansion of the state
action doctrine under state licensing arrangements, will not be known until the Court
faces the same issues in another context. Nevertheless, the regulations of the state liquor
board requiring "compliance by Moose Lodge with provisions of its constitution and by-laws
containing racially discriminatory provisions" implicated the state so as to make that
practice state action. Id. at 179.
37. Compare New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856
(2d Cir. 1975) with Pennsylvania v. Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 392 F.2d
120 (3d Cir. 1968).
38. 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971). See Note, Developing Legal Vistas for the Discouragement of Private Club Discrimination,58 IOWA L. REy. 108, 124-26 (1972).
39. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§71.01(3)(a), (4) (1969).
40. See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972). The court approved the
nascent trend of utilizing a balancing approach for applying the equal protection clause
to private associations as evidenced in Pitts; however, the court adhered to the traditional
significant involvement approach.
Some courts have balanced competing interests when considering whether tax exemptions
constitute state action. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (establishment clause prevailed); Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago
Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971) (freedom of
press prevailed).
41. 513 F.2d 873, 882 (5th Cir. 1975). However, the future of the Fifth Circuit's employment of the lesser standard for state action when racial discrimination is alleged is
uncertain in light of the instant case. See text accompanying notes 67-68 infra.
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aid was substantially greater than the amount in Pitts, the absence of
alleged racial discrimination shielded the hospital policy of prohibiting abortions from constitutional scrutiny.42 The Fifth Circuit found insufficient state
involvement although the hospital was located on public property, was constructed with state expenditures, and was subject to an agreement that it be
run on a non-profit basis to serve the needs of county indigents. s The lesser
standard of state involvement for state action inquiries has also been implicitly embraced by the Supreme Court in Norwood v. Harrison4 4 a case
dealing with a private segregated school. Concluding that the school was
ineligible for distribution of state-purchased textbooks, the Court stated that:
"[S]uch private bias is not barred by the Constitution, nor does it invoke
any sanction of laws, but neither can it call on the Constitution for material
aid from the State."45
In the instant case, the panel majority found significant state involvement under each of the three theories but relied heavily on the Burton joint
actor rationale.46 Noting the lessor-lessee relationship, the court found that
47
the city and dub were interdependent, each benefiting from the arrangement.
The panel further observed that the nominal rental was tantamount to substantial governmental aid;4s thus, the state was indirectly supporting the
club's discriminatory membership practices.4 9 Citing Pitts, the panel adopted
the lesser standard of state involvement, specifically asserting that an
attenuated test was essential to find state action.50 Furthermore, the panel
applied the public function-' concept to the club's dock and mooring facilities.
Since the city's acquisition of the deed for the bay bottom land had been

42. Id. In Greco the interests of the private hospital in setting its own medical policy

were balanced against those of the physicians seeking to perform abortions.
43. Judge Coleman, author of the majority opinion of the en banc court, graphically
noted in his panel dissent the greater degree of state involvement in Greco as compared
to that in the instant case. 521 F.2d at 355.
44. 413 U.S. 455,460 (1973).

45. Id. at 470. The majority referred to the first amendment freedom of association
by noting that it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections. The
weight of that reference in a case focusing on a private club's discriminatory membership
practices, rather than a private school's discriminatory admission practices, is unknown.

The distinction may be critical as there is no affirmative national goal to desegregate bona
fide private clubs as is the case with the nation's schools.
46. See text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
47. 521 F.2d at 351-52. In determining this interdependence, the club's exclusive utiliza-

tion of the leased bay bottom land and its inability to function for its intended purpose
without it were heavily emphasized. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974)

(the Court distinguished between exclusive and nonexclusive use of public-owned recreational
facilities by private segregated schools for constitutional purposes and found the former
to be state action violating the equal protection clause). See note 56 infra.

48. 521 F.2d at 352-53.
49. Compare 521 F.2d at 352, n.20 with note 33 supra.
50. Id. at 350-51. See text accompanying notes 37-40 supra. The panel failed to recognize

that the Pitts court balanced the interests of the discriminatee and fraternal organization
prior to finding state action rather than basing its finding solely on the presence of racial
discrimination.
51. See text accompanying notes 21-26 supra.
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conditioned on the land's use for public purposes 52 and since there was a
shortage of similar facilities in the public sector,5 3 the court was persuaded
that the club was sufficiently entwined with government to impose constitutional restraints on its discriminatory membership practices. The majority
recognized the club's associational interests but felt they were outweighed by
the overwhelming social policy behind the elimination of discrimination.The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the panel's decision, concluding
that the leasing arrangement did not provide a "sufficiently close nexus between the city and club so that the action of the club may be fairly treated
as that of the city."' 5 Burton was distinguished as having dealt with a public
accommodation.56 Because a state-issued liquor license, a requisite to a private
club's financial existence, had been attributed little significance in Moose
Lodge, the instant majority accorded similar treatment to the argument that
"but for" the bay bottom land the club could not exist as a yacht club.5s
Writing for the majority, 5 Judge Coleman reasoned that since the club
had utilized the bay bottom land prior to the city's acquisition of the deed
and execution of the lease,5 9 the subsequent involvement was insignificant, and
the required nexus was attenuated. Once the city and club had commenced
a lessor-lessee relationship, however, the club's previous conduct was irrelevant.
52. 521 F.2d at 347, 351-53. The club had been utilizing the bay bottom land through
mere custom and usage prior to the city's assertion of ownership in 1962 by virtue of a
1949 deed from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund of the State of Florida.
Because the deed terms required the land to be used for public purposes only, in 1969 the
city obtained a waiver in order to lease the bay bottom land to the club. Id.
53. It is not likely that the city has an affirmative duty to provide docking space, a
requirement of the public function theory. See note 22 supra.
54. 521 F.2d at 353. The majority referred to, and quoted in part, Justice Douglas'
dissent in Moose Lodge in which he stated: "[T]he associational rights which our system
honors permit all white, all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed. Government
may not tell a man or woman who his or her associates must be." 407 U.S. at 179-80. The
majority then stated "that private exercise of freedom of association must function without
significant state support and involvement." 521 F.2d at 353. This statement demonstrates
that the court ignored its actual finding of minimal involvement. See note 50 supra.
55. 530 F.2d 16, 22 (5th Cir. 1976).
56. Id. at 22. The dissent emphasized the implications of Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974). 530 F.2d at 31-32. In Gilmore, a private segregated school was
barred from the exclusive use and control of a municipal park for playground purposes
since city authorization for this purpose constituted state action. Thus, the dissent noted
that "Gilmore clearly proscribes the exclusive use of public property by racially discriminatory
organizations." Id. at 31 (emphasis original). Although the dissent conceded that Gilmore
does not stand for the proposition that discriminatory organizations can never use public
facilities, the exclusive use and control of bay bottom land by the club can be distinguished
from the Gilmore case. Since all bay bottom land is owned by the state, the club, unlike
the private school, had no alternative but to lease from the state; moreover, it did not
totally deprive the public of waterfront access, as was the case with the park in
Gilmore. Given the club's ownership of adjacent land on which the clubhouse was
located, the exclusive use and control is more a consequence of its concurrent property
rights than an out-right state franchise, as the dissent submitted. See note 47 supra.
57. 530 F.2d at 22.
58. Id. at 16.
59. For a historical view of the club's existence and utilization of the bay bottom land,
see 530 F.2d at 21-22.
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State action analysis looks to the degree of governmental involvement in
private discriminatory conduct that is otherwise lawful, not whether the private
conduct would have continued regardless of the relationship assumed with
the state. If the court's analysis was followed, virtually no private conduct
would be imbued with state action, and the doctrine itself would be rendered,
ineffectual.
The majority also rejected the panel's adoption of the lesser standard of
state involvement. 0 Although Norwood suggests that a more careful examination of the facts is warranted when discrimination is present and results in
a denial of an important right, Moose Lodge indicates that discrimination is
merely another factor to be considered among the aggregate of facts. Thus,
the discrimination itself is apparently less significant than the context and
61
circumstances in which it is found.
The majority weakened its decision by refusing to consider all of the
facts deemed pertinent by the lower courts. The majority overlooked the
panel's finding that the club performed a public function by providing docks
on city-owned land that, as a condition to deed acquisition, was to serve the
public interest. 62 In addition, the court cursorily dismissed the finding that
the token annual rent was state aid, absent an express holding by the district
court that such rent constituted a substantial contribution to the financial
support of the dub.6 3 This conclusion was reached even though the nominal
rental indisputably conferred a benefit on the club.State action is primarily a factual determination made on a case by case
basis. Although courts often disagree as to the legal significance of particular
facts, the law of state action is necessarily deprived of meaningful precedent
and threatened with inconsistent results when appellate courts arbitrarily
exclude from consideration relevant facts found by the lower courts.
It is apparent that the majority's holding was influenced by its concern
65
for the special nature and unique interests of the bona fide private club.
The rights of association and privacy as applied to the private club should be
60. "The basic principle remains the same in either type case: the facts either establish
or do not establish significant state involvement in the private activity." 530 F.2d at 19.
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974),
pointed out that the Court had not adopted different standards for state action analysis
when different constitutional claims were presented. 419 U.S. at 353.
61. See, e.g., Antoun, State Action: Judicial Perpetuation of the State/Private Distinction, 2 0Ho NoRaT L. Rxv. 722, 728-29 (1975).
62. 521 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1975). The majority noted the existence of the ordinances
but stated that the district court had decided the case solely on fourteenth amendment
grounds and that review had been granted only on that basis. 530 F.2d at 22.
63. 530 F.2d at 18.
64. The dissent took judicial notice that the token annual rent was a subsidy. 530
F.2d at 33.
65. Judge Coleman seemed appalled by the prospect of a federal district court, for the
first time in history, supervising the membership policies of a private club. He also,
emphasized throughout his opinion that the club is genuinely private. 530 F.2d at 17.
Moreover, in his panel dissent, Judge Coleman stated that: "One wonders what is to.
become of the heretofore loudly trumpeted constitutionally guaranteed rights of privacy
and freedom of association." 521 F.2d at 356.
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